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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-1651 
____________ 
 
THURSTON SANDERS, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MR. WOMACK,  
Supervisor of Education Programs - West;  
MS. JOHN PIERRE, Assist. Supervisor of Education;  
 NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.N.J. No. 1-17-cv-01218) 
District Judge: Noel L. Hillman       
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 2, 2018 
Before: MCKEE, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 30, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Thurston Sanders appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his pro se 
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
 Sanders, then an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution, Fort Dix, N.J., filed 
a complaint and in forma pauperis application in the United States District Court for the 
District Court of New Jersey.1  Sanders named as defendants the United States of 
America, Mr. Womack, the Supervisor of Education Programs at FCI Fort Dix, and Ms. 
John Pierre, the Assistant Supervisor of Education Programs, and alleged that they had 
terminated his participation in the Lincoln Technical Institute Heating, Ventilation and 
Air Conditioning (“HVAC”) Training Program because he was “too old.”2  Sanders 
asserted jurisdiction under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Age Discrimination in Federally Assisted 
Programs Act (“ADFAP”).  Complaint, ¶ 1a.  Sanders sought $1,200,000.00 in damages 
and alleged that he had exhausted his administrative remedies.  
 The District Court granted Sanders leave to appeal in forma pauperis and his 
complaint was filed.  Then, in an order entered on February 16, 2018, the Court 
dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915(A) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, determining that the ADFAP, 
                                              
1 Sanders has since been released from prison. 
 
2 Sanders also named as a defendant the New Jersey Department of Corrections, but, as 
the District Court noted, there are no allegations in the complaint against the state 
Department of Corrections.  This defendant thus was properly dismissed under §§ 
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. 
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42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107, does not apply to federal agencies, such as the Bureau of 
Prisons, which administer their own funds.  See Sanders v. United States, 2018 WL 
918889 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2018).  The Court further determined without discussion that 
Sanders had identified no Bivens claim for relief, id. at *1 n.2, and denied Sanders leave 
to amend because any amendment would be futile. 
Sanders appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In his pro se 
brief, Sanders contends that the District Court erred in dismissing his claim under the 
ADFAP, and he seeks the appointment of counsel and discovery.  We note that he has 
included in the Appendix a copy of a letter from the BOP Northeast Regional Counsel, 
rejecting his administrative tort claim for age discrimination and psychological distress 
on the ground that he did not allege a physical injury actionable under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2), § 2672. 
 We will affirm.  Because Sanders was proceeding in forma pauperis and was 
incarcerated, his complaint was subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A).  We agree with the District Court that Sanders’ 
claim is not cognizable under the ADFAP.  That Act provides that “no person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 6102.  It defines “program or activity” as 
including the operations of certain types of state and local government entities, 
educational institutions, and private organizations, which receive federal funding for their 
programs, id. at § 6107(4), but it does not include federal agencies, such as the Bureau of 
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Prisons, which administer their own funds.  See Maloney v. Social Security 
Administration, 517 F.3d 70, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  The ADFAP does not 
apply to “programs directly administered by the federal government.”  Id. at 75.  Sanders 
specifically alleged that federal employees of the BOP, in their capacities as the 
Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor of Educational Programs at FCI Fort Dix, denied 
him the benefit of participating in one of the BOP’s educational programs for inmates.  
Thus, his complaint concerns actions taken by a federal agency administering its own 
funds. 
 This does not mean that he is without a legal remedy, however, or that the BOP 
has a license to discriminate on the basis of age.  When such discrimination occurs, the 
Constitution itself or the BOP’s own Program Statements may provide an appropriate 
remedy.  With respect to federal constitutional rights, a Bivens action is the federal 
equivalent of civil rights suits brought against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 
we thus consider Sanders’ age discrimination claim against the individual defendants to 
have been brought under Bivens as well.  See Marshall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 518 
F. Supp.2d 190, 193 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2007).  Here, the District Court determined that the 
complaint could not proceed under § 1915(2)(B)(ii) and Rule 12(b)(6).  Rule 12(b)(6) 
tests the sufficiency of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.  See Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).  A complaint should be dismissed under 
Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  
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Although factual averments must be accepted as true, legal conclusions are disregarded.  
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Assuming that Sanders intended to state due process and equal protection 
violations, we are not persuaded that a Bivens claim could proceed.  In the Marshall case, 
the inmate sued BOP employees because he too had requested to participate in the HVAC 
training program but was denied participation because he did not meet the program’s age 
restriction of 18 to 25 years.  518 F.Supp.2d at 193.  The District Court for the District of 
Colombia held that the inmate could not state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
because inmates do not have a due process right to participate in vocational and 
educational programs, id. at 194 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), and 
because age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause, id. at 195 
(citing Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (“Old age also does 
not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal 
life spans, will experience it.”)).  Because rational basis analysis applies to an inmate’s 
claim of age discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, we consider only 
whether the defendants’ actions here were rationally related to a legitimate prison 
objective, see Marshall, 518 F. Supp.2d at 195.  This is a difficult test for Sanders to 
meet.  As he himself acknowledges in his complaint, HVAC training is a post-secondary 
school educational opportunity which can lead to small business ownership and thus a 
lifetime of earnings.  Accordingly, we agree with the Marshall court that reserving that 
opportunity for young inmates is not irrational.  Id. at 196.  
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 Last, we note that the Bureau of Prisons Program Statement pertaining to Non-
Discrimination Toward Inmates states that Bureau staff “shall not discriminate against 
inmates on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, disability, or political belief,” 
Program Statement 1040.04, https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/1040_004.pdf, but it 
does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of age. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A).  Sanders’ requests in his 
pro se brief for appointment of counsel and discovery are denied.   
